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Abstract: What exactly does conceptual analysis consist in? Is it empirical or a priori? 
How does it support philosophical theses, and what kinds of thesis are these? There is 
no consensus on these questions in contemporary philosophy. This paper aims to defend 
conceptual analysis by showing that it comprises a number of different methods and by 
explaining their importance in philosophy. After setting out an initial dilemma for 
conceptual analysis, the paper outlines a minimal ecumenical account of concepts, as 
well as an account of concept possession and concept employment. On the basis of 
these accounts, the paper then argues that there are both empirical and a priori forms of 
conceptual analysis, and that each can be defended as legitimate methods. The 
philosophical interest of conceptual analysis, however, resides in relying on all three 
types of method in the service of answering philosophical concerns. This is illustrated 
by three sample cases. 
Keywords: a priori, armchair philosophy, conceptual analysis, conceptual engineering, 
philosophical method. 
1. A Dilemma for Conceptual Analysis 
Conceptual analysis has seemed to many philosophers to be an important, if not central 
philosophical activity.1 Philosophers, on such a view, analyse concepts like the concept 
of knowledge, of free will, justice, personhood, identity, truth, beauty, reason, 
obligation and many more.2 Conceptual analysis has had the reputation of being a 
method, that can be carried out in an a priori manner, and from the proverbial armchair, 
by consideration of hypothetical cases (fictional scenarios, thought experiments). 
However, conceptual analysis faces the following dilemma. Concepts, the conceptual 
                                               
1 For example to Ryle (1949), Carnap (1950), Grice (1958, 1987), Strawson (1963, 1992), Jackson 
(1998), Chalmers & Jackson (2001) or Nolan (2009). 
2 They may also theorize about knowledge, free will, justice etc. as opposed to the concepts thereof. It 
is here assumed that these are distinct objects of investigation. This essay is about conceptual analysis 
and tries to explain the interest of various forms of it. It is not taken for granted that the purpose of 
analysis of the concept of, e.g., justice, is the acquisition of knowledge about justice. 
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analyst’s objects of research, can either (i) be identified as the concepts particular 
individuals or groups actually employ in thought. Alternatively, (ii) concepts can be 
identified by specifying their defining characteristics (such as rules of correct 
application, inference rules, possession conditions, etc). Each of these two options 
seems problematic. 
On the first horn of the dilemma the object of investigation is empirical: actual 
episodes of thought, psychological processes or, in so far as concepts are shared, group 
interactions, etc. This leads to at least two problems: on the one hand, it is not clear 
how armchair consideration of hypothetical cases can provide adequate evidence on 
this empirical subject matter. (Experimental philosophers tend to point out 
shortcomings of this sort.) Secondly, it seems problematic to say that philosophers are 
centrally pursuing empirical questions on psychological or sociological terrain—not 
just because they would be dabbling and poaching in foreign academic disciplines, but 
because philosophy would seem deprived of its own proper subject matter.3 
On the second horn of the dilemma, the subject matter, i.e. concepts as abstract 
objects, identified by definition, may be susceptible to purely a priori methods, but there 
is doubt about the relevance of such a priori investigations to philosophical concerns. 
In Strawson’s words (commenting on Carnap):  
[T]ypical philosophical problems about the concepts used in non-scientific 
discourse cannot be solved by laying down the rules of use of exact and fruitful 
concepts in science. To do this last is not to solve the typical philosophical 
problem, but to change the subject. (Strawson 1963, p. 505) 
The worry is that if one identifies a concept by laying down a definition it may be 
possible to arrive at purely a priori conclusions about the concept thus defined, but there 
is no guarantee that these conclusions concern the original philosophical worry about, 
e.g., justice or freedom. They may simply be irrelevant. 
What lessons should be drawn for philosophy and the project of conceptual analysis? 
Leaving aside the large faction of those who carry on unreflectively without 
acknowledging any problem, contemporary responses can be classified as follows: a 
                                               
3 This will seem a problem both to philosophers who, like Bealer 1998, regard philosophy as distinct 
from empirical science, and to those, like Papineau 2009, 2014 or Kornblith 2002, who think that 
philosophy is continuous with science but still has its proper subject matter. 
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rejection of conceptual analysis, an endorsement of the first horn and an endorsement 
of the second horn. 
First, some reject conceptual analysis altogether, i.e. they deny that conceptual 
analysis is an important philosophical activity. These philosophers will interpret what 
might look like the examination of, say, concepts of knowledge, free will, etc via 
consideration of fictional cases as in fact a method for investigating knowledge, free  
will etc themselves.  
Secondly, some embrace the first horn of the dilemma and insist that conceptual 
analysis targets psychological and/or sociological facts about humans. This can involve 
the recommendation of proper experimental methods (usually methods known from 
social science or psychology) to investigate this subject matter. It can also involve 
defending traditional armchair methods to some extent, not as a priori, but as empirical 
methods. This response is common among contemporary experimental philosophers, 
but it has been widespread already before the recent movement in experimental 
philosophy.  
A variant of this second approach, not always distinguished properly, involves 
regarding as the target of analysis not concepts but meanings of natural language 
expressions. On this view, the point of considering fictional cases and thought-
experiments is to gather data about language use and thereby about the semantic 
properties of expressions.4  
Thirdly, there are those philosophers who embrace the second horn and accept that 
conceptual analysis uses purely a priori methods to study abstract entities (concepts) 
that are identified by definition. 
The first type of response has been the dominant attitude for some time: since 
Quine’s criticism of analyticity, a certain hostility towards conceptual analysis has been 
prevalent. There have been serious attempts to explain how the method of considering 
fictional cases can yield knowledge about free will, knowledge, and other philosophical 
targets of analysis without a detour via concepts or meanings (to mention just a few 
examples: Yablo 1993, Kornblith 2002, Williamson 2007, 2018; Cappelen 2012; Levin 
                                               
4 The variant could also be seen as a variant of the first response: rejecting conceptual analysis (both 
horns) and reinterpreting what philosophers do—in this case as meaning analysis. Very often, 
philosophers who see themselves as doing conceptual analysis take for granted that this involves the 
analysis of the meaning of linguistic expressions that express the concepts in question. Grice 1958, 
Strawson 1992, Jackson 1998, Thomasson 2015 are typical examples. 
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2014; Papineau 2014; Bengson 2015; Horvath 2018). The second type of response has 
also had its supporters, e.g. Grice 1958, 1987; Strawson 1963, 1992; Jackson 1998; 
Chalmers & Jackson 2001; Chalmers 2012; Machery 2017). Many have long regarded 
the point of considering hypothetical cases as eliciting judgements that reveal 
something about our concepts—or on the mentioned variant: about our linguistic 
competence (e.g. Grice 1958, 1987; Strawson 1992, Chalmers 1998, Nolan 2009 and 
Thomasson 2015) 5 . It is this conception that is the main target of criticism from 
experimental philosophers. They take for granted that conceptual analysis targets 
psychological (or perhaps psychological-cum-sociological) entities and criticize 
armchair methods as methods for targeting these empirical phenomena. What they 
propose is primarily an improvement, or even replacement, of traditional philosophical 
methods for pursuing conceptual analysis (see e.g. Machery 2017, see Sytsma & 
Buckwalter 2016 for an overview).  
The third type of response tends to be neglected or forgotten in this context—even 
though it is the only approach on which conceptual analysis has a chance of being a 
genuinely a priori pursuit that does not postulate extravagant philosophical faculties.  
It is my aim in this paper to put forward a pluralistic view of conceptual analysis that 
not only recognizes the importance of both empirical and a priori methods of conceptual 
analysis, but also stresses that they complement one another in the pursuit of further 
philosophical goals. There is a variety of questions about concepts that philosophers 
pursue, and there is a corresponding variety of methods of conceptual analysis. Often, 
finding out about our concepts has both an empirical and an a priori aspect. This 
becomes especially clear when philosophers pursue questions about concepts not just 
with a descriptive, but with a prescriptive or normative agenda. The view proposed here 
neither precludes nor defends the possibility of there also being worthwhile 
philosophical questions that do not involve analysing concepts (as proponents of the 
first response often claim). 
                                               
5 I will use the term “judgement” when some theorists use “intuition”. The term “intuition” is unhelpful 
in the current methodological discussion, because it tends to be understood as already connoting a 
certain justificatory role (see, e.g. Kauppinen 2013). In our context, it will be clearer to speak of 
judgements with certain justificatorily relevant characteristics, such as being experientially justified, 
spontaneous, made by an authoritative or competent thinker, etc. Sometimes, intuitions are thought of 
not as judgements but as experiences or other quasi-perceptual states (see, e.g. Bengson 2015). Here, 
too, I try to keep things clear by not using the term “intuition”. In any case, those theorists using the 
term “intuition” are not usually using it to denote a source of evidence in a project of conceptual 
analysis.  
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There is a lot of controversy about concepts and no consensus on what concepts are. 
These controversies are mostly orthogonal to the methodological proposals concerning 
conceptual analysis that I will be making. So I shall begin in §2 by developing a 
minimal account of concepts that will allow me to present my pluralistic methodology 
of conceptual analysis in such a way that it can be articulated within all approaches to 
concepts, thus making my proposal relevant independently of the view one may hold 
about concepts. This will allow me in §3 to draw a straightforward distinction between 
empirical and a priori questions about concepts. In order to give concrete substance to 
some of my proposals, I will need to add some flesh to the minimal skeleton account 
of concepts, which I will do by sketching a view of concept employment and its 
behavioural manifestations in §4. Equipped with these accounts of concepts and 
concept employment, I shall then proceed in §§5–7 to explain some a priori and 
empirical methods by which concepts can be examined, and how these can complement 
one another in the pursuit of philosophical aims. 
2. A Minimal Account of Concepts 
What are concepts? Some basic ingredients seem to be present in almost all accounts 
of concepts: concepts are, in some sense, constituents or tools of thought. They classify 
in that they (typically) apply selectively to some and not to other things.6 For example, 
the concept of a tree, or better a concept of tree, is employed by a thinker who believes 
or thinks that the recent storm has uprooted some trees. One needs, in some sense, to 
have or possess such a concept, in order to be able to form that belief or to think that 
thought. Such a concept in some sense occurs in, or partially constitutes the belief. It 
is correct to apply the concept to some things, but not to others: in order for the belief 
that the storm has uprooted some trees to be true, it will not be sufficient that an 
electricity pylon get uprooted. It needs to be something to which the tree concept in 
question can be correctly applied.  
This much is perhaps uncontroversial common ground in discussions about 
concepts. In sum: (i) concepts can be possessed by thinkers; (ii) employed by those 
                                               
6 My talk of concepts in general “applying selectively” should not be taken to rule out that some 
concepts apply to everything, and some to nothing at all. 
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thinkers in episodes of thought (the concepts can be said to occur in such thoughts); 
and (iii) it can be correct or not to apply a concept to an object.7 
But there are many different conceptions of concepts that interpret this minimal 
common ground.8 Usually, the different conceptions are assumed to be rivals, and to be 
incompatible with one another. One important group will think of concepts as abstract 
objects that are constituents of another type of abstract object, namely of propositions 
or Fregean thoughts (for example Peacocke 1992, Zalta 2001 or Båve 2019). Members 
of this group will have some view about how individual thinkers are related to concepts 
and propositions to make sense of the idea of them “employing” or “having” concepts. 
Another important group think of concepts as concrete mental representations in the 
minds of thinkers (e.g. Millikan 2000, Margolis & Laurence 2007, Carey 2009). 
According to Machery 2009, this psychological conception views concepts as “bodies 
of knowledge” of a certain kind that are “used by default in the processes underlying 
higher cognition” (Machery 2009, p. 50). Members of this group will have some view 
on whether and how different thinkers can be employing the same concept, and in what 
sense some concept applications are correct while others are not. 
I do not share the assumption that rivalling conceptions of concepts are generally 
incompatible with one another.9 Adopting one of these conceptions need not put one in 
any substantial (non-verbal) conflict with any of the others—although, of course, there 
is a general obligation to make clear what one is talking about. In this section, I shall 
distinguish some basic conceptions of concepts and how these different conceptions 
can be employed to talk in different but compatible ways about the same phenomena. 
The point of this is to identify some points at which there is no non-verbal disagreement 
between the conceptions, in order to eliminate some sources of misunderstanding. 
One of the basic points on which different conceptions of concepts diverge is 
whether concepts are to be unchangeable entities or whether they can change over time, 
perhaps coming into existence, or ceasing to exist, at some point in time. 
                                               
7 NB: element (iii) of this minimal common ground says merely that in principle it can be correct or 
incorrect to apply a concept in a given case. This says nothing about how correctness of application is 
determined, whether correctness is defined for all possible cases (rather than only partially), or whether 
it is possible to articulate such conditions, e.g. by formulating necessary and sufficient conditions. Thus 
it is a truly minimal assumption. 
8 See for example Margolis and Laurence 2014, for an overview. 
9 Thus, I agree with Machery 2009 that what Machery calls “psychological” and “philosophical” 
conceptions of concepts are meant to address very different theoretical questions. I also agree with 
Glock 2011 and Camp 2015 that the conceptions can complement one another. 
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Studying the history or development of concepts seems to be an endeavour that calls 
for the latter type of conception. If, for example, I want to discuss the history of the 
concept of a smartphone it looks like it would be convenient to think of this concept as 
a concept that was created at some point, perhaps in the late 1990s, and that has possibly 
undergone various changes since then. Similarly, one may legitimately wonder whether 
the (a certain group’s) concept of plagiarism has changed since the advent of the 
internet. Of course, we must distinguish the question whether smartphones and 
plagiarism have changed from the question whether the concepts of smartphone and of 
plagiarism have changed. For it is obvious that plagiarism has changed since the advent 
of the internet (a new type of source has become available), while it is not so obvious 
whether the concept of plagiarism has changed. One reason to say that a concept has 
changed would be if the conditions for correct application of the concept change. 
Arguably, the concept of a planet changed in this way when the condition of being 
gravitationally dominant in one’s neighbourhood became one of the conditions an 
object needs to meet in order for it to be correct to apply the concept to it. 
Clearly, if I want to describe matters in such a way that a concept comes into 
existence and changes, I must conceive of concepts as objects that persist over time and 
can undergo changes. Any such conception will involve (or presuppose) some view as 
to what constitutes concept identity over time, and perhaps also a view about how 
concepts come into existence. One common approach here is to individuate concepts 
by way of the linguistic expressions that are used to express judgements in which the 
concepts occur. Thus, one could say that the concept of plagiarism is simply the concept 
expressed by the word “plagiarism” in English (and perhaps its translations)10. Another 
approach is that of introducing a deference relation, so that one episode of concept 
employment counts as employing the same concept as another, if one stands in the 
deference relation to the other. The deference relation could involve one thinker’s 
intention to use the same concept as another thinker (or the same thinker on another 
occasion).11  
However, it is also possible to conceive of concepts as unchanging abstract entities. 
Studying the logical properties of concepts, and the logical relations among concepts, 
                                               
10 See, e.g. Jackson 1998, Thomasson, 2015. Of course, there are also further questions about what it is 
for a word to express a concept and also about the identity of words, or expressions, over time. 
11 Sainsbury & Tye 2011, 2012 pursue this type of approach. 
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seems to call for this type of conception. For example, in order to study whether a 
concept of truth is incoherent due to the liar paradox, it is convenient to focus on 
principles governing the correct application of the concept in question, in this case the 
equivalence principle. If I want to know whether a concept of freedom is such that an 
agent whose actions are causally determined could be free, it is again convenient to 
think of the concept of freedom in question as being governed by some principles 
concerning the conditions under which it can be correctly applied—in this case some 
principles about what it takes for an agent to be free. For these sorts of enquiry it is 
convenient to conceive of concepts as characterised constitutively by principles 
concerning correct application because the logical properties at which the inquiry aims 
depend on such principles. Thus it is no surprise that in this sort of project, philosophers 
typically start by articulating conditions of correct application or principles governing 
the concepts they are interested in.  
A conception of concepts according to which concepts change over time—especially 
in so far as they change the principles of correct application to which they are subject 
—would be unnecessarily cumbersome if the focus of enquiry is precisely on those 
principles and their logical consequences. However, this is mere inconvenience. Of 
course I can frame my examination about a certain unchangeable concept of truth as an 
examination of the equivalence principle, a principle to which the changeable concept 
of truth used by a certain population is subject at a certain point in time. Or I could 
frame the examination simply as an examination of the equivalence principle and its 
consequences, not even using the term “concept”. A historian of concepts using a 
conception of changeable concepts should have no objection at all to the other theorist’s 
different conception of unchangeable concepts. 
Could the historian of concepts also symmetrically dispense with his or her 
conception of changeable concepts? Again, it would be inconvenient, but possible. 
Rather than saying that some individual’s or group’s concept of a smartphone was 
created and subsequently underwent changes with regard to the principles that govern 
it, the historian could instead say that a certain concept user, or community of concept 
users, at one point used one concept, constitutively characterised by one set of 
principles, and at a later point used a distinct concept constitutively characterised by 
different principles. 
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There need therefore be no disagreement of substance between conceptions of 
concepts as changeable or as unchangeable. One and the same theorist could coherently 
and productively use both conceptions provided she made sure to avoid confusions—
for example by introducing disambiguating terminology. For example, a theorist could 
say that conceptsU are unchangeable and constitutively governed by certain principles 
regarding correct application, while conceptsC can change their principles of correct 
application over time and are individuated by, for example, chains of deference or 
words used to express them. Such a theorist might even construe conceptsC as 
constituted by time-slices in such a way that each time-slice is (or determines) a unique 
conceptU. 
Another variation in conceptions of concepts worth discussing briefly is that 
between individual and social conceptions of concept. Amongst those who think of 
concepts as changeable continuants whose history or development can be examined, 
some mean to speak about (recurrent) representations in individual minds as manifested 
in individual behaviour (e.g. Millikan 2011); while others mean to speak about 
recurrent representations that are shared across different individuals, as manifested in 
social interactions (e.g. Sainsbury & Tye 2012). In my view, there need again be no 
substantial disagreement. Where the social conception speaks of cross-subject identity 
of concepts, the individualist will speak of mere cross-subject “classification” (see 
Millikan 2011). In other words, the socialist’s conceptsCS may be classes of the 
individualist’s conceptsCI. Of course, whether the similarities between the conceptsCI of 
distinct individuals are ever great enough to make for sufficiently interesting conceptsCS 
that are classes of conceptsCI, may well be a substantial point of debate. 
Related to social versus individualistic conceptions of concepts is the question of 
externalism versus internalism about concepts. According to externalism, it can depend 
in part on a thinker’s external environment, which conceptU she is employing, or what 
the conditions of correct application of their conceptC are at a given point in time. 
Internalism denies this. What has been said so far should be compatible with 
externalism and externalism alike. (We will revisit externalism when discussing 
empirical conceptual analysis below.) 
Let me return to the minimal common ground about concepts mentioned at the 
beginning: (i) concepts can be possessed by thinkers; (ii) thinkers who possess a 
concept can employ that concept in an episode of thought (the concept can occur in that 
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thought); and (iii) it can be correct or not to apply a concept to an object. We can now 
see that these three points are compatible with several different conceptions of 
concepts, and that these different conceptions themselves do not yet indicate any non-
verbal disagreement between their proponents. 
3. Empirical and A Priori Discovery 
Given that minimally, concepts can occur in the thoughts of thinkers that possess them, 
and are also subject to some conditions of correct application, we can distinguish two 
ways of conducting research about them: empirical and a priori. Suppose a researcher 
stipulates that she is going to examine a concept C that is characterized by feature F. 
Then it is possible to examine the deductive consequences of C having F, and the results 
of this examination will be a priori, for they relied only on stipulation and deduction.12 
But it is also possible to conduct empirical research on concept C, as characterized, by 
considering empirical consequences of C having F. This second examination will be 
empirical, and not a priori. 
For illustration, consider some examples. Suppose the conceptual analyst stipulates 
that she is going to examine the concept, call it “true1”, expressed by a certain group 
G (during time-span t) by the expression “true”. Starting with this stipulation, it will be 
a priori that when a member of G uses the word “true” (during t), she expresses  the 
concept true1. It will be an a posteriori question whether true1 is subject to the 
equivalence principle, which states that any proposition that p falls under true1 iff p. 
Empirical data that could be taken to bear on the issue might be data concerning the 
behaviour of members of G, and the evidential significance of such data will depend on 
further hypotheses and possibly further stipulative assumptions. For example, the 
tendency (in favourable conditions) of members of G to accept instances of the schema 
‘It is true that p if and only if p.’ might count as data in favour of true1 being subject to 
the equivalence principle.  
Suppose, however, the conceptual analyst stipulates that she is going to examine a 
concept, call it “true2”, whose conditions of correct application are governed by the 
equivalence principle. If these are the terms of the investigation, the question whether 
true2 is governed by the equivalence principle is not empirical. By contrast, the 
                                               
12 Thus, the conclusions drawn would be analytic in the minimal and inoffensive sense of deriving from 
stipulations and deduction alone (compare Frege 1884, Juhl & Loomis 2009, ch. 6). 
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question whether members of G (during t) express true2 by their utterances of “true” is 
empirical. 
Before moving on I want to make three remarks about the distinction between a 
priori and empirical questions about concepts that I have introduced. First, the 
distinction classifies questions about concepts in unexpected ways. There is a tendency 
in the literature to assume that it is so-called psychological conceptions of concepts that 
give rise to empirical questions, and so-called philosophical or abstract conceptions of 
concepts that allegedly give rise to a priori questions. My distinction opens up both 
empirical and a priori questions on either type of conception. The crucial question, each 
time, is how the object of investigation is framed, what initial stipulations the theorist 
makes. Thus, there can be both a priori and empirical questions on each conception of 
concepts. In particular, it is not the case that philosophical conceptions of concepts as 
abstract objects automatically lead to a purely a priori enquiry.  
Secondly, the distinction is not affected by the usual scepticism about a priori 
methods which derives from criticism of a certain notion of analyticity. While there are 
important philosophical issues about the epistemology of deduction, and while there 
may also be issues about what happens when a stipulation is made, these are not the 
issues that drive mainstream philosophical scepticism about analyticity. So I believe 
that it is legitimate, for current purposes, to assume that stipulation, or stipulative 
definition, together with deduction, can give rise to a priori justification and 
knowledge.13 
Thirdly, and correlatively: to the extent to which the account of a priori questions 
here offered is innocuous and immune to standard criticisms, it may also seem to be far 
too modest to give rise to any interesting account of a priori conceptual analysis. What 
                                               
13 This sort of analyticity is not even a target of Williamson’s recent objections: once it is stipulated that 
“every” is not to be existence-entailing, and after it has been stipulated for a range of common nouns 
‘F’ that ‘F’ is either true or false for every object, claims of the form ‘every F is an F’ will be analytic 
even in Williamson’s strong sense that competence entails assent (cf. Williamson 2007).  Or, to 
mention another Williamsonian example: even Vann McGee will agree that a conditional connective 
that is stipulated to support modus ponens supports modus ponens (cf. Williamson 2003). Compare 
Juhl & Loomis 2009, ch. 6, who defend the epistemological significance of a minimal notion of 
analyticity*; as well as Soysal 2018 for a similar-spirited objection to Williamson’s arguments. 
This sort of apriority is also not the target of recent criticisms of the Jackson-Chalmers approach, 
e.g. Stalnaker 2001, Laurence & Margolis 2003, Schroeter 2006 all criticize Chalmers and Jackson 
because they claim that we have a priori knowledge of what our concepts are (what our terms mean). 
Thus, their target is our second response to the intitial dilemma. 
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is interesting about the deductive consequences of stipulations? In his book on 
conceptual analysis, Jackson writes: 
If I say that what I mean —never mind what others mean—by a free action is one 
such that the agent would have done otherwise if he or she had chosen to, then 
the existence of free actions so conceived will be secured, and so will the 
compatibility of free action with determinism. … But … [I won’t have] much of 
an audience. I have turned interesting philosophical debates into easy exercises in 
deductions from stipulative definitions together with accepted facts. (1998, p. 31)  
Stipulative definitions and their deductive consequences, however, can be relevant and 
interesting if the definitions capture (aspects of) the concepts we actually use (or, as in 
Jackson’s own approach, if they capture the meanings of the expressions we actually 
use). Thus, a priori results can be interesting for empirical reasons. Moreover, it is a 
mistake to think that deduction is always an easy exercise: many results in deductive 
logic are far from easy.  
It will be the task of §§5–7 to fill these abstract remarks on a priori and empirical 
conceptual analysis with concrete content. 
4. Employing Concepts 
I have just made a general distinction between a priori and empirical questions about 
concepts merely on the basis of the minimal common ground about concepts: that 
concepts can be employed in thought by thinkers who possess them, and that they are 
subject to some conditions of correct application. Typically empirical conceptual 
analysis identifies a concept by stipulating that it is the concept employed in a given 
episode of thought or expressed by a given linguistic expression in a given speech 
community, and then proceeds to collect empirical data to draw conclusions about the 
correctness conditions of the concept thus identified. So, in order to give a more 
substantial characterisation of this empirical method, it will be necessary to flesh out 
the minimal common ground about concepts with a more substantial account of what 
is involved in concept possession and concept employment, and how they are 
manifested, so as to be able to explain what types of behaviour can be counted as 
empirical data about concepts identified in the way suggested. 
What is it for a thinker to possess a concept, and, in a given episode of thought, to 
employ that concept? At a minimum, in order to possess a concept, a thinker needs to 
have a classificatory mechanism that is in some way sensitive to the concept’s 
  13 
 
correctness conditions (more on sensitivity shortly). “Classificatory mechanism” here 
simply means an ability to classify items that can be repeatedly exercised. For example, 
let us say that the concept bike is a concept that can be correctly applied to all and only 
bicycles. Then possession of the concept bike would involve a stable ability to classify 
objects in a way that is sensitive to these correctness conditions (i.e. sensitive to objects 
being bicycles) and to store corresponding information about objects. Employing a 
concept will then simply amount to exercising the ability that constitutes possession of 
the concept, and to do so in the formation of a belief. 
I said that the possession of a concept requires a classificatory mechanism that is 
sensitive to the correctness conditions of the concept. I need to spell this out a little. A 
straightforward way for a classificatory mechanism to be sensitive to correctness 
conditions is for it simply to classify reliably in accordance with correctness conditions. 
This could mean that the mechanism reliably categorises an item only if it meets the 
correctness conditions (or if the thinker believes that it does). However, concept 
possession should not preclude regular mistakes, so this (i.e. reliably correct 
application) cannot be the only way to be sensitive. There should be room for 
unreliability among concept possessors. Thus, sensitivity to correctness conditions may 
be realised by a mere disposition to classify correctly under favourable conditions of 
classification. If conditions are rarely or never favourable, then sensitivity in this sense 
is perfectly compatible with frequent error, for frequent absence of favourable 
conditions can generate frequent incorrect application.  
But there can also be concept possessors who would not even be reliably right if 
conditions were favourable. This can happen when sensitivity to the correctness 
conditions is socially mediated and takes the form of deference to other concept users: 
I may depend in my classifications on the testimony of authorities or experts, who in 
turn are sensitive in a more direct or autonomous way to correctness conditions (see 
Burge 1979). Thus, even though I am not fully competent regarding the application 
conditions of the concepts arthritis, say, I still count as using the same concept as the 
experts—and it is they whose classifications under favourable conditions determine the 
application conditions. 
This brings me to the social character of concept possession and concept 
employment. Individuals may possess and employ concepts not only in virtue of their 
own dispositions to form beliefs, but also in virtue of membership in a group whose 
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members stand in social relations of, for example, authority, deference, etc. Individual 
concept users may be sensitive to the correctness conditions of a concept only in the 
sense that they stand to be corrected in their classifications by other users who are 
sensitive in a more direct way, for example via a disposition to correct application under 
favourable conditions. Moreover, concepts are usually acquired in a social way: fully 
competent thinkers serve as models for novices, novices emulate the models and thus 
acquire classificatory habits that are calibrated with their models. 
In order to honour the ecumenical approach to concepts so far pursued, let me say 
that it is, of course, possible to pursue a completely individualistic view of concepts 
and their employment. On such a view, one may have to count the expert in a 
community as employing a distinct concept from the non-expert. When I, the non-
expert, have a belief that I would express by saying “I have arthritis.”, I employ a 
distinct concept from the expert who has a belief they would express by those words.  
Perhaps my concept is the concept that it is correct to apply to an ailment if and only if 
the medical experts call it “arthritis”, while the expert’s concept is one that it is correct 
to apply to an ailment iff it is an inflammation of a joint. How promising or useful this 
approach is need not be addressed here. For our purposes we just need to note such an 
individualistic approach to concepts and their employment will have a different view 
about what data about the manifestation of concept use show about the concepts 
employed. The view of conceptual analysis here defended is compatible with this 
individualistic view—even though it will change what type of empirical evidence is 
relevant and how it is interpreted. 
To sum up: concept possession involves a classificatory mechanism, i.e. a stable 
ability to form beliefs of a certain sort that is sensitive to the concept’s correctness 
conditions. This sensitivity can take various forms: for example, a disposition to 
classify in accordance with the correctness conditions under favourable conditions, or 
deference to the judgements of authoritative users of the concept who, perhaps, in their 
turn classify in accordance with the correctness conditions when conditions are 
favourable. Concept employment can then be viewed simply as the exercise of the 
corresponding classificatory mechanism. 
This account of possession and employment provides an indication of how 
behaviour can indicate concept employment: classificatory mechanisms can be 
manifested when exercised (they are dispositions). In particular, if I want to answer the 
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empirical question whether a concept possessed by a given individual is subject to 
certain correctness conditions, then that individual’s employments of the concept under 
favourable conditions will be relevant empirical data. If the question is one about a 
given concept shared by a group, then, depending on the precise social nature of the 
concept, the employments of the concept by the relevant authorities within that group 
may prove to be the most relevant data. 
Two further clarificatory remarks about concepts, their possession and employment 
may be helpful: First, given my characterizations, there may well be several rival 
concepts possession and employment of which makes equally good sense of a person’s 
manifested dispositions. In that case, it may be indeterminate whether in a given 
episode of thought, a person is employing a particular concept rather than one of the 
rivals. For our purposes, we can leave open whether this happens: the usefulness of 
conceptual analysis, as portrayed in this paper, is compatible with the relationships of 
possession and employment being vague or underdetermined. Secondly, this account 
of concepts, their possession and their employment is compatible with a kind of 
metaphysical minimalism about concepts: to describe an episode of thought or an 
interaction among several thinkers in terms of concepts employed is merely one way of 
describing that episode and those interactions in a way that systematizes certain 
regularities. Concepts, like propositions, could simply be “measures” of the mind (cf. 
Matthews 1994). 
5. Empirical Investigations of Concepts 
It may seem, then, that the only substantial questions about concepts are empirical 
questions regarding the concepts we actually employ in given episodes of thought, or 
the concepts we express when using certain linguistic expressions. For, if Jackson is 
right, easy deductions from stipulative definitions (by themselves) are irrelevant to the 
questions that interest philosophers. I do not believe that all purely a priori issues are 
easy or philosophically uninteresting, but that is the subject of the next section. In this 
section, I shall elaborate on empirical research about concepts in philosophy, starting 
with what seems to be a widespread method: the method of cases.  
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It is sometimes thought that philosophers can investigate a concept by consulting 
their own judgements 14  involving that concept. Often, philosophers will consider 
elaborate, even fantastical, scenarios and adjudicate whether a concept of interest 
applies or does not apply to a given entity in that scenario. Thus, an investigation into 
the concept of a person may proceed by looking at various fictional cases and drawing 
on judgements about who is a person, or counts as the same person, in these cases. Or 
an investigation about the concept of free will may proceed by looking at various 
scenarios in which an agent acts and draw on judgements as to whether the agent acted 
freely. This procedure is often described by saying that these philosophers are 
conducting “thought experiments”.  
To begin with, let me emphasise that I am treating this sort of method as empirical, 
not a priori. Since these thought experiments can be conducted from the proverbial 
armchair, they may seem superficially to be an a priori investigation. On my view, 
however, the procedure can be methodologically justified only on the assumption that 
it yields empirical evidence. How can it be justified? 
Following the distinction made in §3, empirical investigations involve identifying a 
concept by making some stipulation about the concept one is interested in, and then to 
gather empirical evidence about the concept thus identified—using hypotheses about 
concept employment of the sort described in §4. For example, my target concept may 
be the concept person, identified as the concept expressed by the expression “person” 
in a given community C. If this is the starting point, then it counts as a priori that the 
concept person is the concept expressed by the expression “person” in C, for I simply 
stipulated that in order to identify the target concept. But I could now gather data about 
the way members of C use the expression “person”, for example by presenting them 
with elaborate scenarios and asking them questions, or eliciting statements from them, 
involving the term “person”. If I myself am a member of C, then my statements or 
answers to these questions have evidential force. It may have smaller or greater 
evidential force depending on the extent to which I am representative of C, and also 
depending on whether my answers are influenced by biases on my part. Thus, given 
these two important caveats, I can use my own judgements as empirical evidence 
regarding the concept expressed by “person”. 
                                               
14 See footnote 5 above. 
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In principle, a target concept can also be identified without saying that it is the 
concept expressed by a given expression. For example, there may be a range of 
“personal attributes”, i.e. properties we tend to attribute to persons. If we then stipulate 
that the concept person is that of a potential holder of personal attributes, then we could 
gather empirical evidence on how thinkers (in some community C) attribute this sort of 
property, and how they store this information. Thus, if friendliness, unfriendliness, 
laziness, smartness, honesty, viciousness etc were such personal attributes, we could 
look at how thinkers store such information in order to see how they identify the 
possessors of these properties over time. Again: the conceptual analyst’s own behaviour 
has evidential weight to the extent to which they are representative of the target 
community, and to the extent to which they are not biased. 
Thus, the classic armchair method to investigate concepts by considering 
hypothetical cases can be methodologically sound within the mentioned constraints. 
But the constraints are important and they give rise to legitimate concern about 
philosophers relying on their own judgements as evidence about a given concept. Such 
concerns have led to a wave of criticism of armchair methods in philosophy, criticisms 
that often do expose possible methodological flaws. 
First, the conceptual analyst’s own judgements may be biased because he or she has 
a stake in the outcome of their own investigation. Wishful thinking can impair one’s 
judgement even in cases where one has no antecedent expectation or theoretical 
allegiance: for example through the wish to find something interesting. The situation is 
worse when philosophers rely on judgements concerning outlandish possibilities, that 
never occur in actual applications of the concept, so that it is unclear whether they are 
exercising an existing classificatory mechanism or rather an ability to extrapolate or 
creatively extend their conceptual repertoire.15 
Secondly, conceptual analysts, in consulting their own judgements, may also fail to 
be representative of the target group. In a classic paper, Machery et al. question the 
evidential significance of theorists’ judgements about proper names and their referents 
on the basis of cross-cultural variation in such judgements (Machery et al 2004). 
Obviously, when the analyst’s own judgements, that are used as evidence, diverge from 
                                               
15 See Sytsma & Buckwalter 2016 and Machery 2017. 
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those of a significant part of the target group, then this undermines the evidential force 
of these data. Can an armchair conceptual analyst respond to this charge? 
Concerns about representativeness require different responses depending on the 
exact target of investigation. Suppose the target is a concept employed by an individual, 
or perhaps by the individual and her local social group, and the conceptual analyst is 
either identical to the individual or a member of the local group. Then there will not be 
a problem with cross-cultural variation: the variation will simply show that other 
cultural groups do not have the same concept (or perhaps do not express the same 
concept by the expression in question) as the target individual or the target local group. 
(NB: even when there is no problem of representativeness, there may still be a problem 
of bias.) 
The response will need to be different if the target of investigation is a concept of a 
certain group G and the variation in behaviour has been observed precisely across that 
G. 16  In this case, variation within G—be it cross-cultural or along different 
dimensions—is a problem, and calls for correction in the conceptual analyst’s flawed 
procedure. Perhaps the identification of the target concept wrongly presupposes that 
group G is uniform in certain respect. Thus the analyst might correct the target by 
restricting the group and stick to the armchair method. Alternatively, she might stick to 
the target but gather data of a different sort, for example by conducting experiments on 
a properly representative sample of members of G.  
On the view I have presented, the conceptual analyst’s own armchair data and the 
data from controlled experiments on a representative sample, both constitute evidence 
of the same type: they measure the manifestations of those dispositions the analyst 
seeks to analyse. Armchair data, while less costly to produce, are less reliable, because 
they may be subject to biases or the researcher’s failure to be representative of the target 
group. Proper experiments therefore produce superior data that allow more reliable 
inferences about the concepts employed by groups. 
This does not mean, however, that we should ban armchair methods altogether. 
There could be cases where the superior evidence generated by controlled experiments, 
                                               
16 And this seems to be the case in the target of the studies to which Machery et al. intended to object in 
their early paper: the target here seems to have been a notion of reference assumed to be shared 
amongst all human societies. So the finding of cross-cultural variation was highly significant at least 
relative to that target of investigation. 
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as compared to armchair evidence, is not worth the extra cost of such experiments. 
There could be questions about concepts where it would be a waste of resources to 
conduct an experiment—simply because the evidence generated from the armchair is 
already good enough on those questions. For example, we may not need an experiment 
to check whether the concept square (as employed by such and such a group) entails 
the concept equilateral. Or whether it is part of possessing vague concepts (such as 
heap, bald, or red, as employed in a certain group) that undetectable differences do not 
make a difference. In some cases, the benefit of ruling out biases and ensuring the 
representativeness of the sample might be so slim as to be simply outweighed by the 
extra cost of conducting suitable experiments. Moreover, even before such an 
experiment is carried out, a researcher would be well advised to consider first the cheap 
and easy evidence that can be gotten from the armchair, before investing much more 
effort into an experiment. The armchair evidence such a potential experimenter already 
has before the experiment is not worthless. 
Thus, to sum up my conclusions about empirical investigations regarding concepts 
we actually use: Depending on the exact question we are trying to answer, relying on 
the researcher’s own judgements as evidence can be perfectly adequate. However, in 
case where there is a danger of researcher bias, or where there is variation across 
different thinkers in the target group, experimental methods are the obvious way to 
improve the evidential situation. There are both important continuities and important 
differences between experimental and armchair methods. Both are in principle sound 
empirical methods for investigating concepts within the limits pointed out above. 
6. A priori Investigations of Concepts 
Following the distinction from §3, a priori investigations about concepts rely on 
deduction and stipulation only. Of course, the status of deduction as a source of 
knowledge is an important area of research in itself. But for current purposes it is not 
unreasonable, I believe, to assume that deduction is a bona fide a priori source of 
knowledge. The same goes for stipulation: when I decide to investigate concepts that 
are governed by a certain principle, then it seems as uncontroversial as it is trivial that 
I know that these concepts are governed by that principle. Thus, any method that 
investigates the deductive consequences of stipulations seems in principle to be a sound 
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a priori method (of course, this does not rule out the possibility of deductive error or 
incoherent stipulations). 
The challenge is rather to explain how mere stipulation and deduction could yield 
any philosophically interesting results. I believe that most of the philosophical interest 
of a priori results derives from the actuality or possibility of us using concepts with the 
features deductively examined. I shall use this section to distinguish four ways in which 
a priori results about concepts may be philosophically useful or interesting. The next 
section will provide illustrative examples of these ways. 
First, there may be such a thing as a purely intellectual interest in making 
observations about the deductive consequences of some properties a concept may have. 
Thus, perhaps some philosophers are interested in the exact settings in which an 
equivalence principle concerning the concept of truth leads to the liar paradox, and their 
interest is completely independent of the possibility that a concept we actually use may 
be subject to that principle. I believe that that is a possibility, and that there is a lot of 
such non-trivial a priori knowledge that one could acquire. However, it is doubtful that 
this purely intellectual interest drives much philosophical research.  
Secondly, we may have a desire to understand the concepts we have. A priori results 
about concepts with certain characteristics can derive their interest from a desire to 
understand ourselves and our own intellectual tools. For we may have (empirical) 
reason to believe that we actually employ concepts with characteristics more or less 
similar to those explored. (I suspect that even the most abstract logical investigations 
about concepts will typically derive in some way from such an assumption of empirical 
relevance.) Once we believe that we employ concepts with certain characteristics, we 
may want to explore the consequences of this.  
Perhaps this is the time to come clean that exploring the deductive consequences of 
certain characteristics of concepts may include exploring these consequences under 
certain further empirical hypotheses. For example, suppose we are exploring the 
consequences of a tolerance principle governing vague concepts, which says that if the 
concept applies to an object, then it must also apply to any undetectably different 
objects. Then we will be interested in the consequences of the principle on the empirical 
assumption that a sorites series, in which neighbouring objects do not differ detectably, 
exists. 
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Thirdly and relatedly, then, our interest may be diagnostic. We may be interested in 
diagnosing problems that we suspect may arise from the concepts we employ. Again, 
given the empirical assumption that we use a concept with given characteristics, and 
perhaps given further empirical assumptions, we may be interested in working out what 
follows deductively. The results may show that a concept is inconsistent, that it is 
trivial, or perhaps that it is inconsistent with certain further assumptions we want to 
make. 
Fourthly, our interest may be constructive. We may be interested in mapping out the 
properties even of concepts we do not currently use because we want to know what it 
would be like if we were to use them. The aim here may be to improve our conceptual 
repertoire by replacing or improving old concepts or adding new ones. Again, mapping 
out the consequences here may involve making further empirical assumptions. 
To sum up, while there is plenty of non-trivial a priori knowledge about concepts to 
be had, there are three important ways in which this knowledge can become 
philosophically interesting in so far as these concepts are actually, or might potentially, 
be employed by thinkers. 
7. Conceptual Analysis at Work 
The debate about the problems of armchair methods in supporting empirical claims 
about concepts in my view distracts from some of the most important roles of 
conceptual analysis in philosophy. The a priori study of concepts independently of 
whether anyone ever uses these concepts, may be of limited interest. But by itself, the 
empirical study of the concepts actually employed by human thinkers looks more like 
a psychological or sociological, than a philosophical method.17 In this section, I want to 
illustrate with concrete examples how all three methods of conceptual analysis: the two 
empirical methods (armchair and experimental) and the a priori method, can be 
harnessed to advance philosophical concerns, thereby uncovering the important roles 
conceptual analysis has in philosophy. 
                                               
17 I am aware that some philosophers do have doubts about the legitimacy of philosophy as a separate 
discipline precisely because they think philosophy is mainly concerned with empirical questions about 
concepts that would be much better addressed with the empirical methods of psychologists or 
sociologists. I hope this paper provides the germ of a historically more charitable conception of 
philosophy’s subject matter. 
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In §6, I distinguished three types of philosophical aim for which a priori knowledge 
about concepts can be useful in so far as the concepts in question are, or might be, 
employed by us: (i) clarifying our own concepts, (ii) diagnosis of conceptual problems 
and (iii) conceptual improvement. Much of the most interesting philosophical work 
simply involves purely a priori reasoning about concepts that are of interest to us 
because they are concepts that we do use, are similar to concepts we use, are concepts 
that we might consider using, etc. In order to back up this claim, let me illustrate it with 
three examples. 
The first example is that of research aimed at resolving the liar paradox. Researchers 
in this field are clearly engaged in elaborate a priori work concerning various precisely 
defined concepts (or languages), assessing and comparing their a priori derivable 
properties. These are indeed exercises in deduction from stipulative definitions, but 
they need not be as “easy” and as irrelevant as Jackson and Strawson suggest (see 
quotes above). Such research derives its interest from the fact that a concept we use, 
expressed by the English expression “true”, seems to be subject to a problematic 
requirement, namely that it make true instances of the equivalence schema. Whether 
anyone employs a concept that is indeed subject to such requirements is an empirical 
question to be investigated by the kinds of empirical methods mentioned in §5. But 
many of those working on the liar think of themselves as engaged in the project of 
examining the a priori consequences of such requirements on a concept (e.g. Tarski 
1956/1933). Many liar researchers operate on the assumption that the truth concept we 
have must be consistent (empirical assumption), so that the project of finding a truth 
concept that is not liar-susceptible ultimately contributes to the empirical project of 
specifying the exact correctness conditions of the truth concept we have (philosophical 
aims (i) and (ii) above). 
Other liar-researchers may follow a different narrative: that of providing a 
stipulatively defined concept that shares certain features of the truth concept we use, so 
that the former could take the latter’s role, but is an improvement in that it does not 
suffer from the liar problem. The latter group may further split into those who think of 
themselves as offering a Carnapian explication (cf. Carnap 1950), and those who think 
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they are offering a replacement (see e.g. Scharp 2007, cf. Eklund 2002).18 All three types 
of liar researchers engage in philosophically interesting work, work that is largely 
stipulative-deductive conceptual analysis. The philosophical interest derives from the 
fact that the stipulatively defined and deductively examined concepts are in some 
respects similar to concepts we use, but better in other respects (aim (iii) above).  
The example of research on the liar is just an example in which it is especially clear 
that the purely a priori aspect is not easy, not trivial, and not irrelevant. There are 
countless research questions in philosophy that involve, or can involve, examining 
candidate definitions and the properties that follow. For example, questions on 
vagueness, identity, personal identity, necessity, theories of truth (when the liar is not 
concerned), probability, persistence through time, etc. 
My second example is research into moral concepts, such as the concepts morally 
good, morally required, rational or related moral concepts. Clearly, research in this 
area often involves mapping out the consequences of precise candidate definitions, or 
candidate defining principles, of such concepts. This is largely a priori work, involving 
stipulative definitions and mapping out deductive consequences, although the 
consequences being mapped may include deductive consequences that follow from 
candidate definitions or principles together with certain empirical assumptions.  
The theoretical aims that moral theorists see themselves as pursuing, and for which 
these purely a priori considerations are meant to be useful, can vary. A stipulative 
definition of “good”, “required” or “rational” and its purely a priori properties, may be 
interesting because “good”, “required” or “rational” as we actually use it, means 
something very similar. The a priori properties of a moral concept with given 
application conditions may be interesting because the moral concepts we actually 
employ have these, or similar, application conditions (aim (i)).19  
But the properties that follow a priori from certain stipulations about expressions or 
concepts may also be interesting if we are trying to decide which expressions or 
concepts it would be good to have. Many moral theorists regard moral theory as a more 
or less revisionary project. Mill’s Utilitarianism (1861) can be read in this way (see 
                                               
18 Yet others, e.g. Tarski 1944, do not share the assumption that there is a unique concept expressed by 
the predicate “is true”, but instead think that the expression may be ambiguous or may not have a 
definite meaning. 
19 This seems to be the outlook in Jackson 1998 and in Jackson & Pettit 1995. 
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Brink 2013, §10). Richard Brandt explicitly pursues the project of proposing 
“reforming definitions” (Brandt 1979, pp. 3–13). Peter Railton (1989) not only sees his 
own task as revisionary, he also claims that  
most philosophers in [the 20th] century … have wanted to avoid outright 
abandonment of value discourse and have shied away from claiming that our 
value judgements are systematically false, and so have opted for some sort of 
revisionism. (159).  
These philosophers are not changing the topic or reaching results that are irrelevant to 
our actual moral terms or concepts, as Strawson and Jackson fear. Rather, they are 
considering and proposing refinements or improvements (aim (iii)). 
The idea of reflective equilibrium, taken from Goodman (in the context of justifying 
deduction) and applied by Rawls (1971) in the area of moral and political theory, seems 
to point in a similar direction. Reflective equilibrium seems to be an ongoing, gradual 
process of conceptual development: theorists construct moral principles or definitions 
that predict as systematically as possible, our considered moral judgements. Then, as a 
result of reflection on such principles, we change our mind about some of the 
considered judgements. We revise the principles, reflect again on the considered 
judgements and change our minds again. Such a process is often discussed as a method 
of justification in moral epistemology. But it is also a process of gradual revision of our 
conceptual repertoire, one that moral theorists seem to want to set off and engage in. 
We are replacing our moral concepts by slightly different new concepts, re-evaluate 
and replace again. 
Here too, working out a priori consequences of candidate definitions or principles, 
and perhaps working out their consequences in certain concrete or hypothetical 
situations, is highly relevant and philosophically interesting, not because the definitions 
or principles accurately capture our conceptual practice, but the interest lies precisely 
in the differences between the stipulated concepts we examine and the concepts we 
seem to have been using when arriving at our considered judgements (aim (iii)). 
The third example is that of recent explicit proposals to “engineer” certain concepts 
in order to improve our conceptual repertoires and thereby effect social or political 
changes. A classic point of reference in the growing literature on conceptual 
engineering are Sally Haslanger’s and others’ proposals to “ameliorate” the concepts 
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of race or gender (Haslanger 2000, see also Cappelen 2017, ch. 1, for an overview). 
Again, certain candidate concepts are identified stipulatively, the a priori and a 
posteriori consequences of adopting such concepts are explored. For example, 
Haslanger proposes a certain stipulative definition of “woman” and considers (using 
empirical assumptions about human societies) what would be the social and political 
consequences of adopting such a definition. In general, conceptual engineering 
involves examining concepts, stipulatively identified, and making a case, on practical, 
moral or political grounds, for prescribing the use of some of the explored concepts, 
and to legislate that certain expressions already in use should be taken to express these 
concepts (aim (iii)).20 
In my view, these three examples provide paradigm examples of the important joint 
role a priori and empirical conceptual analysis can play in philosophy. 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, I have addressed an embarrassing dilemma for the method of conceptual 
analysis: either (i) it aims at empirical theses about the minds of individuals or groups, 
and is therefore highly unreliable when performed from the armchair, or (ii) it aims at 
a priori theses about concepts that are stipulatively defined and is therefore irrelevant 
to philosophical concerns.  
My response to the dilemma has been to embrace both horns: after introducing a 
minimal account of concepts, I distinguished empirical from purely a priori questions 
about concepts. Within the empirical category, I distinguished quasi-empirical 
“armchair” methods of empirically examining concepts from experimental methods, 
but argued that both can be legitimate, each with its own advantages and limits. I also 
made a case for the importance of purely a priori conceptual analysis in philosophy. 
This defence of a priori conceptual analysis did not rely on especially ambitious or 
contentious epistemological assumptions: all it required was that we can generate a 
priori knowledge by making use of stipulation and deduction. The defence relied on a 
                                               
20 True, the method of exploration is not only purely a priori: in addition to purely deductive means, the 
investigation has to rely also on empirical information on what effects concept use has. But the relevant 
empirical information here is not information about which concepts the target expressions actually 
express, but rather on what would be the causal effects on individuals and groups if the target 
expressions were to express certain different concepts. 
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pluralistic picture of what philosophers are up to when they engage in conceptual 
analysis, ranging from the exploration of concepts that we have empirical reason to 
believe are like the concepts we use, to the considerations it would be good for us to 
have. 21 
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